

# SOCIALISTS AND THE COLONIES

# Venture

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## Comment

### HOPE IN CYPRUS?

THE appointment of Sir Hugh Foot to succeed Field-Marshal Sir John Harding as Governor of Cyprus showed at last that touch of imagination which has been so lamentably lacking in the past in the Government's handling of the Cyprus problem. The new Governor carried with him the goodwill and the hope of all who have been urging a settlement. Few could, however, have foreseen the extent to which Sir Hugh, by wise, temperate words and courageous action, transformed the political atmosphere on the island in less than a month.

When he arrived the situation was looking ugly. Eoka's patience was wearing thin after a truce which seemed to them abortive, and the security forces were showing signs of edginess. Greco-Turkish relations in the island were deteriorating further. Communal demonstrations had degenerated into rioting following the appearance of the military on the scene. Cyprus Government propaganda, so often inept and ill-timed, seemed almost designed to inflame the situation. Routine Eoka leaflets were represented as announcing a return to full-scale violence. Murders that bore all the marks of *crime passionnel* or private vendetta were officially attributed to Eoka. The existence of the Ashiotis list (of persons alleged to be marked down for assassination by Eoka) was officially announced to a sceptical press and public.

This was the atmosphere in which Sir Hugh Foot toured the island by car, on horseback and on foot, with none of the security precautions that inevitably accompanied the movement of his predecessor. His easy, informal approach, his personal courage, and his obvious desire to learn what ordinary folk were thinking, won him respect and a large measure of affection. His talks on the radio, friendly but firm, statesmanlike without being pompous, enhanced the impression he had created. He had restored to the Cypriots the precious gift of hope.

Despite the improved political climate—or perhaps on account of it—Eoka made it clear that, though prepared to hold their hand for a limited time, they remained suspicious of British intentions. The Turkish minority still uttered cries of 'Partition!', which were echoed in Ankara. Greece's failure to obtain a two-thirds majority for their resolution at U.N.O. seems to have affected opinion in Athens hardly at all. Archbishop Makarios continues to insist that the problem lies between Britain and the Cypriot people and can only be solved by direct negotiations. His recent utterances have been more conciliatory in tone and he has called for 'a peaceful atmosphere' in which negotiations could take place.

Armed with first-hand knowledge of the immediate situation, Sir Hugh returned to London, as he had always intended, early in January. Clear in his own mind as to the first steps to be taken on the road towards a settlement, he now faced the more difficult task of converting the Colonial Secretary and the Cabinet to his plan. The extent to which he has succeeded will emerge in the weeks to come.

### UGANDA UNITY

THE resignation from the Legislative Council of two members of the new United Congress Party looked at one time as though it might provoke a major constitutional crisis. The latest news, however, suggests that the Governor has decided not to force the issue in Buganda and the storm clouds seem to have passed over.

The reasons given by Dr. Muwazi and Mr. Lubogo to justify their withdrawal from Legco. were never very convincing and have quickly been forgotten as more interesting developments have followed. Dr. Muwazi was a representative member for Buganda and Mr. Lubogo a representative member from Busoga. Until direct elections are held later this year the vacancy created by the resignation of Dr. Muwazi can only be filled by a person selected by the electoral college in Buganda. This follows from the Buganda Agree-



ment, 1955, which provides that the Katikiro (Prime Minister) shall submit to the Governor the names of candidates for appointment of representative members 'that is to say persons who have been elected for that purpose in accordance with the Second Schedule of the Agreement.' The Second Schedule sets up an electoral college which is itself elected by a system of indirect elections based ultimately on a suffrage identical with that for elections to the Lukiko. When a vacancy occurs in Legco it is to be filled by a person chosen by a ballot of members of the electoral college. The only function of the Katikiro is to summon the college when a vacancy occurs and thereafter to submit to the Governor the name of the person chosen.

So far the electoral college has refused to fill the vacancy and has indeed gone further by calling on the other representative members from Buganda to resign their seats also. The District Council of Busoga has followed this lead and refused to select a successor to Mr. Lubogo. The first reaction of the Protectorate Government to all this was sharp. The Governor addressed a letter to the electoral college pointing out that the Buganda Agreement, 1955, provided that (on the basis of the present composition of Legco) Buganda must be represented by five members, and it was therefore the duty of the electoral college to fill the vacancy. The college was unmoved and confirmed its previous decision not to elect. The Governor has now announced that the vacancy for Busoga (where there is no agreement to tie his hands) will be filled by nomination, but has apparently decided to acquiesce in the decision of the college not to fill the Buganda vacancy. The change of front is no doubt made possible by the fact that the other representative members from Buganda have not so far resigned their seats and are unlikely to do so.

It is by no means easy to assess the significance of this affair. The simple explanation that it is a revival of the old separatist attitude in Buganda does not really fit the facts. No doubt it is true that there is a working alliance between the United Congress Party and the Buganda traditionalists, but who is making the pace? The resolution passed by the college contained the following passage: 'The Legislative Council should be composed of an African elected majority and only then would Buganda representative members be of any advantage to their constituents and only then would the Council have the confidence of Africans.' This is a very reasonable point of view for an African nationalist, but is not the voice of Buganda separatism. It is very obvious that if there were an African majority in Legco this would greatly increase its prestige and no doubt

inevitably weaken the authority of the Lukiko and the Kabaka's Government. It may be this consideration rather than a meticulous concern for the law which led the Chairman of the college to resign. The Chairman is a civil servant in the Kabaka's Government and private secretary to the Omuwanika (Treasurer). Certainly the Kabaka's Ministers have acted throughout this affair with perfect propriety and have given no indication of support to the attitude of the college.

Whatever interpretation is put on recent events they are undoubtedly evidence of a serious *malaise*. If the Legco is to be accepted without reservations by all sections of opinion in Uganda as an instrument of constitutional progress its place in the constitution after self-government must be defined *now*. It is useless to go on saying that Uganda must be developed as a unitary state when it is already to a large extent a federation. The relationship between Buganda and the Protectorate is federal in character, and this must inevitably influence the future shape of constitutional development in other areas. The real question is not 'federal or unitary' but what kind of federation.

## NYERERE'S RESIGNATION

THE news from Tanganyika is discouraging. The Government made an imaginative and constructive move last summer by inviting Julius Nyerere, the President of the Tanganyika African National Union, to join the Legislative Council as a nominated unofficial member. No one denies that T.A.N.U. commands widespread support throughout the territory and that the confidence of the only African nationalist organisation must be won if progress on all fronts is to be achieved and racial conflict avoided.

Mr. Nyerere says that 'the Government has consistently, and for the most part for unconvincing reasons, rejected every proposal that I have made in Legislative Council. Most of the proposals have been compromises on those originally made by my organisation. I suggested that if the Government could not change the constitution now at least a constitutional committee could be appointed to study the constitution and make recommendations, including the franchise.' Three requests were originally made by T.A.N.U.: from the beginning of the new Legislative Council there should be parity between Africans and non-Africans on the unofficial side, instead of the present ten, ten, ten basis for the three racial groups; that elections should take place in all constituencies in 1958, and not in five of the ten as is at present proposed; that it should not be compulsory for a voter to use all three votes (one for an Asian, one for a European and one for an



African). The Africans maintain that this compulsion is confusing.

Mr. Nyerere moved a motion in Legco asking for the removal of the compulsory tripartite voting system and for the elections to take place throughout the territory in 1958, but leaving out the demand for parity with non-Africans. During the debate, he accepted an amendment deleting the second part of his motion. Further, on the Local Government (Amendment) Bill, which is opposed by the Chiefs, because it ignores their position as traditional rulers, instead of moving the rejection, he asked for the third reading to be postponed for six months as the Chiefs were shortly meeting at Mzumbe and time could be given for consultation. He argued that out of 56 Native Authority Councils which have been set up by Government, 36 have voluntarily accepted non-African participation, which is the Government's objective. It was unwise to create suspicion and irritation and to set back the development of race relations, which was taking place as the result of the initiative of Chiefs and their people.

Registration has been small owing to the confusion in the minds of Africans. Ten days before the lists closed only 22,572 persons of all races had registered throughout the territory. There is still time for Government to make some concessions to African opinion—a policy urged by three of the four members of the U.N. Visiting Mission.

## THE HORN OF AFRICA

THE Afro-Asian Conference has ended in Cairo. Colonel Nasser now has a full time secretariat behind his anti-colonial campaign in Africa, and there is inflammable material for him among the Somalis. Ever since Michael Mariano and Sultan Behi returned from the fruitless delegation to the U.N. in 1955, there has been bitter disillusionment over the Haud and Reserved Area immemorial grazing lands of the Somali herdsmen being handed back to Ethiopia.

Several factors in this tangled situation stand out clearly. Firstly, that Somalia (ex-Italian) is scheduled for independence in 1960, whether people think she is fit for it or not, and in Mogadishu to-day more and more Italians are leaving and their places are being taken by Somalis. Secondly, politically conscious British Somalis in Hageisa organised by the National United Front, are unanimous with the Somali Youth League, in desiring a tie-up with Somalia to form a greater state, and ultimately to gain unification with their kinsmen now governed by the French and Ethiopians. Thirdly, Ethiopia has been and still is an expansionist power, as witness the Emperor's speech at Gabredarre in August,

1956. Educated Ethiopians visualise a large Federal Union, extending to Cape Guardafui containing a Somali State similar to Eritrea. Fourthly, the overwhelming majority of the Muslim Somalis, belonging to the hot steppe lands, do not love the Christian Amharic of the high Abyssinian Massif. They have unhappy memories of the past, and will undoubtedly fight to avoid being annexed. They are proud, intractable, nomadic people; in fact the sad thing is, that these immensely attractive people fight among themselves in clan warfare for access to the watering places. Fifthly, whatever the future shape and resources of a United Somalia, it will be just as non-viable as Libya or Jordan, unless the American Sinclair Oil Company strike lucky in the Haud. It will need substantial help, perhaps to the tune of £4m. per annum from some outside source, be it the U.S.A., the U.K., the Soviet Union or preferably the United Nations. What should British policy be in this situation?

It is quite an open secret that the Colonial Office, with its tradition of guardianship of its protectorates, and the Foreign Office, with its 'realpolitik' and fear of Communist penetration in the Middle East, are divided. British Somalis feel they are being let down in the border disputes, and that they are not getting sufficient protection (although the situation has improved lately) under the 1955 treaty. They believe H.M.G. does not wish to antagonise Ethiopia, an ally of the U.S.A. and a recipient of dollar assistance. As against all this, what are the possibilities of the Somalia of 1960 falling under Egyptian influence and thus being indirectly open to communist penetration. At present there are about 250 Somalis who are being educated in Cairo and numbers of Somali teachers trained there are now back in Mogadishu schools. Cairo radio is continually pouring forth anti-British abuse into the bazaars of Aden, Somali-land and as far south as Zanzibar.

It is patent that the less we do, or appear to do for the Somalis under our care, the more chance do we give to the Egyptians to make mischief. Since Lord Lloyd's visit in 1956, plans for economic development have not moved fast enough and there are still too few Somalis, about 40, getting higher education in the U.K. We must push ahead energetically in these fields and at the same time increase the number of armed illalas (police) in the Haud, who safeguard our Somalis in their seasonal migrations westward into Ethiopia.

Beyond this, H.M.G. must begin talks now with all the countries involved, i.e. Ethiopia, France, Italy and America, so that the crisis year, 1960, will not come upon us unprepared. Otherwise war could easily flare up in the Horn, and a situation develop not unlike that between Jew and Arab in Palestine.



# The Malta Crisis

THE case history of the integration of Malta shows the immense psychological and administrative difficulties which must be overcome if even the best intentions are to be put into effect in reforming relations between dominant and colonial territories.

Mintoff had launched the integration solution before he became Prime Minister and, at first, was amazingly successful. He had a report prepared by T. Balogh and D. Seers which set out the economic basis of integration. In July, 1955, he won not only the appointment of a Round Table Parliamentary Conference to study the constitutional problems involved, but also obtained a declaration pledging the help of the British Government (a) to raise the standard of education and social services; (b) to increase employment opportunities to render the island less desperately dependent on defence expenditure; (c) to avoid unemployment. In the autumn of that year an all-party Round Table Conference substantially accepted Mintoff's case and recommended that Malta be granted Parliamentary representation. It was hoped to get the legislation passed by the middle of 1956.

From then onwards hitch after hitch occurred and integration now looks less secure than at any time since 1955. How did this reversal of the fortunes of this revolutionary and seemingly successful proposal come about?

There was, first of all, trouble in Malta. Mintoff's relations with the autocrat of the Maltese Roman Catholic Church have never been happy. Gonzi has always been a bitter foe of socialism and progress and actively intervened to thwart Mintoff. The Round Table Conference provided that the Maltese people should be given an opportunity to express their views. In February, 1956, Mintoff held a referendum, as a general election would not have been suitable to test the electorate on a single issue, since the Maltese electoral law provides for an extremely complicated system of proportional representation (which incidentally forces candidates to fight their own colleagues even more fiercely than their opponents). The Archbishop at the very last minute intervened and asked the faithful to abstain. Thus, while the referendum approved integration by a large majority, those voting for it were a minority of the total electorate. On this basis final arrangements could not be made.

Lennox-Boyd, who had always been in favour of Mintoff's imaginative proposals, while accepting the recommendations of the Round Table Conference, stated that the new constitution would have to receive the assent of a newly elected Maltese Assembly before coming into effect. This meant that another general election would have to be fought in Malta before integration was accomplished. A more awkward fetter on Mintoff's financial policy could hardly be imagined. Necessary if unpopular measures could hardly be contemplated.

The talks on the constitution henceforth were inextricably entangled with struggles for additional finance, each aggravating the other. In the summer

of 1956 there occurred the incident of cutting down the poles of the Rediffusion Company mainly as a result of Mintoff's growing irritation and despair at attempts by the Colonial Office to dictate the overall size of Maltese budgets instead of discussing them on their merits.

An arbitrary limit of £5m. was fixed for the total British contribution. Here once more the continuous neglect of economic planning in the British bureaucracy made itself patently felt; there was no one in the administration who could keep Maltese developments under continuous expert survey and co-operate with Mintoff in hammering out the new policy of Maltese reconstruction. Though a considerable number are employed in the economic departments, they are mostly non-specialists and therefore unable to give help and guidance in the vital matter of economic programmes. After considerable vexation an economic committee was appointed. It basically justified Mintoff's stand in asking for a larger sum than the Colonial Office wished to grant. The crisis for the moment was ended.

## The Question of Economic Equality

The constitutional talks in the meantime bogged down on the question of whether Malta was to be part of the United Kingdom—a vital question for that small island which has no other hope of overcoming restrictions on her emigrants now in force in the United States and elsewhere. And a new disagreement arose on the problem of whether Malta was to be guaranteed economic equality with Britain. This, as the Parliamentary Round Table had been told, was in any case a difficult concept. Was the North of Scotland to be taken as the criterion or the Outer Hebrides or the most prosperous industrial towns? But Mintoff pointed forcibly to the need to assure Malta of adequate long-term help—not mercy grants and subsidies to industry but a positive encouragement to British firms to establish themselves in Malta.

By the end of 1957 all questions had been solved, except three. Two of them were of immediate economic importance, one a question of principle. The first was the problem of the dockyard. While the negotiations had been dragging on, a revolution occurred in Malta's basic strategic, and thus also in her economic, position. The failure of Suez opened the eyes of the Tories and service chiefs to the change in Britain's relative military position and the impact of the new weapons on the mode of warfare. In August, 1957, Duncan Sandys visited the island and indicated that a severe pruning of British expenditure in Malta was impending. This contingency was taken care of by Britain assuring Malta of help, additional to the grants negotiated, and aiming at facilitating industrialisation should any change in defence policy cause unemployment exceeding the British level. The closing of the dockyard would cause severe hardship if it took place before industrialisation got under way. There is no alternative employment on that scale on the island: some



eleven-twelfths of the total income depends directly or indirectly on British defence expenditure.

The Malta Government could not obtain any assurance on this point until November 29th. when a protest meeting had been called by the workers: at that late date Lennox Boyd sent a message to the effect that 'there is enough work to keep the dockyard going for about three years at approximately the present level of activity—whether it continues to be run as a naval establishment or whether it is transferred wholly or in part to commercial interest.'

No information could be gleaned what this message meant in detail. It was known, however, that a number of dockyard workers would be discharged in the first days of January, and the suggestion by the Maltese that they should be taken on by a new NATO oil storage scheme was not accepted.

The second problem which remained unsettled was that of immediate finance: while the long-term arrangement gives a satisfactory financial framework it will not deal with the period before integration. Yet that period is vital if there is to be no delay before the basic facilities are completed on which industrialisation depends. And the menace to the dockyard has made this problem one of life or death. Moreover, the delays that integration has encountered limit Mintoff's liberty of action in respect of raising finance domestically—if he is not to endanger his victory and the fate of integration at the polls.

The British Government took an extraordinarily limited view of this problem. They not merely refused to grant additional finance despite the new menace to Malta's economic future. They even refused to revoke a part of the year's grant in

aid which lapsed because Mintoff had not spent it (the queer consequence of this sort of Treasury chicanery is that no one in any colony will ever dare to save a penny). Now that Mr. Thorneycroft has resigned, however, precisely on the issue of 'softness' in cutting Government expenditure, it will be well-nigh impossible for Mr. Macmillan to go back on his refusal to entertain Mintoff's request to increase the grant. The irresistible force is bound to meet an immovable object.

Yet the change in the outlook for the dockyard would in equity involve a readjustment of the grant. After all the towns and parts of the United Kingdom which are threatened with unemployment will absorb a lot of money automatically through unemployment benefits and assistance, and it is at least probable that remedial action in the form of public votes, etc., will be taken. Though total government expenditure is scheduled to be cut, total public expenditure in these communities is bound to rise even under the Tories. But if relief to the hard hit communities is channelled through automatic arrangements, why should Malta not receive equally favourable treatment, especially as the long-term financial agreement contains some provision to this effect.

The third and last question was the problem of the constitutional status of Malta. Should, indeed could, Malta though practically self-governing, actually become part of the United Kingdom? The uniqueness of the Maltese problem and of the solution raised a host of questions which needed to be thrashed out. The negotiations went on and on, and even after the last visit which lasted over a month the basic problem has not been settled.

*(To be concluded)*

## White Politics in Central Africa

By COLIN LEYS

**P**RESENT Labour thinking about Central Africa seems to be a combination of two points which are really incompatible. One admits, as Mr. Creech Jones put it in the July, 1957, issue of *VENTURE*, that 'the Ministers of the Federation have a delicate job in retaining their hold on European opinion and leading it against the considerable reactionary elements among them'; and goes on to assume that liberalism in the Federation can best be promoted by supporting these Ministers on the grounds that (a) if they lose office, their successors will be less liberal; and (b) given time, they will be able to lead the European population to create a fully liberal democracy, overcoming racial prejudices because these are irrational and having been shown to be so will be abandoned. An analysis of European politics in Central Africa suggests that this policy is largely fallacious. The second policy rests on the powers still possessed by Britain in the Federation, and implies *active intervention*, rapidly advancing Africans' political status in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, etc. It is incompatible with the first because the present Federal Government is totally opposed to it. The support they demand means

treating them as an independent sovereign government. Yet even if a policy of active intervention were pursued wholeheartedly, the facts of political life in the Federation impose severe limits on it: (I shall try to show in a second article what some of these are, and to suggest some of the things a realistic policy for promoting liberalism in Central Africa must take account of). Meantime, what is the fallacy involved in trying to promote liberalism by supporting the Federal Ministers?

First of all, suppose the present Federal and Southern Rhodesian governments were to lose power. Should we not then be told that to refuse to support the new governments (because they were less liberal) would only ultimately harm the entire population of the country? Support for the Federal Ministers is fundamentally support for the regime, not the office-holders of the moment. At bottom, this policy appeals because it is the line of least resistance, and because the present British Government, at any rate, is not particularly critical of the Federal Government's reluctance to dismantle the apparatus of European supremacy. Clearly a Labour Government would

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## FURTHER THOUGHTS ON

THE broad policy of the Labour Party on economic aid to low-income countries has been expounded in the second pamphlet<sup>1</sup> in the series on colonial policy. The general title of the series should not obscure the fact that although colonial status may modify the terms of application of the policy, in its essentials it affects independent low-income countries as well. The basic problem—how to raise the desperately low standard of life—is common to both.

Now the proposal that has caught attention most is that this country should devote one per cent. of its national income, over a period of years, to the aid of backward and colonial territories. Doubts about the policy statement, and especially about this part of it, have been voiced since it appeared. They are of four main kinds. Some people doubt if the one per cent. levy is politically feasible, and say that in present circumstances it's going to be pretty hard to persuade the British electorate to levy itself to this tune for the benefit of others. Some, like Mr. E. F. Schumacher at a recent Fabian School, say that in any case the proposal is economically wrong-headed and may in addition contain a threat to peoples whose way of life ought not to be heedlessly modernised with western cash. Some, like Mr. Schumacher and also Mr. Alec Dickson (the critic at last summer's British Association of Professor Blackett's plea for a large recurring gift with no strings attached), suggest that it is dangerous to suppose that a giver-country and receiver-country relationship (the patron-client relationship, as it may easily become) is necessarily conducive to goodwill; and Mr. Dickson believes that more good would result from an extensively planned effort in common international service in which people (young people at least as much as 'experts') worked together as equals in the field. Lastly, some critics of the policy statement have said that it is very weak on the 'machinery' side, that experience till now of programmes of economic aid shows the need for more careful thought as to ways and means, and as to the co-ordination of different sides of the effort, than the policy statement gives.

To any of these criticisms, if taken as enough in themselves to condemn the policy, there would be (indeed have been) vigorous replies, both by British people who have some experience of the needs of the low-income countries and by citizens of those countries themselves. But most of these would also say that no policy is likely to be good enough that does not take account of these criticisms and, so far as may be possible, synthesise them with the broad positive aim. Can this be done? In particular, can it be done in relation to the last three points? For the first criticism is one that we must find means to deal with if we are convinced that the policy is both just and sound.

No one would quarrel with the aim of the policy in itself: to raise the level of income of the low-income countries. There is hardly need now to get

involved in arguments as to whether people may be 'happier' if they are poor. We may agree that the social price paid for greater income per head may be too high, but no one is going to say that in themselves the ill-health, near-starvation and ignorance of so many people are anything but a shameful evil. Among the masses in these countries there may be the inarticulate conservatism of despair, or of means that permit no experimental risk, but no one will argue that they enjoy being ill, hungry and without technical and intellectual scope.

### The Social Context

Yet all the same the talk of the danger to the 'values' of traditional societies is not to be dismissed as obscurantist. We know from our own social history that the price of economic advance, especially if the prevailing philosophy is one of crude *laissez faire*, may be the destruction of communities and the social and psychological security that they gave to the individual. When Mr. Schumacher said that on being invited to go as an economic expert to Burma he conceived his first duty to be to study Buddhism, and that his colleagues thought this very odd, he was one hundred per cent. right and his colleagues profoundly wrong. Nevertheless one must distinguish between a realisation that economic aid may constitute a powerful intrusion into an existing value system and the comfortable conclusion that 'they are happier as they are.' The suggestion that the values associated with the development of western techniques—call the system 'nominalism' or what you will—is a mere aberration in human experience is surely perverse. So the earlier anthropoid, secure in the value system of life among the tree tops, may have said of those of his fellows who descended and in due course walked erect on two legs. And there is no need to suppose that because the period of gestation of modern technology took three or four hundred years in Europe and North America it must not take less in the countries of Africa and Asia. The reasonable conclusion would seem to be that economic aid should never be thought of, or given, in ignorance of the social context it will affect. The governing phrase should be 'economic and social aid,' not economic aid alone.

The next critical question is one for the economist. How important is the kind of capital provision involved in economic aid? Is it not true of the past, and must it not be true of the future, that in by far the greater part every country must grow its own capital? These countries will no doubt say they would like our aid, and will take it. But what they need far more is the chance to sell us what they can export at a stable price, and at a price so fair that they can accumulate some capital for themselves. Now the Labour Party statement is indeed quite clear and cogent about this. It quotes Mr. Hammerskjöld as saying that 'a change of only 5 per cent. in average export prices is approximately equivalent to the entire annual inflow of private and public

<sup>1</sup> Labour's Colonial Policy. II, Economic Aid.



# **ECONOMIC AID** by LIONEL ELVIN

capital and government grants to under-developed countries'; and what the statement says of the bulk purchase agreements and the like is probably more important than the part about the one per cent. gift. It may be admitted that the latter is 'pump-priming.' But does not the experience of Colonial Development and Welfare grants alone, limited as those have been, suggest that such an injection of outside help is essential, if only to give new hope and induce the attitude that will make progress a possibility?

The doubts about the moral soundness of the giver-receiver relationship go deeper. There was a French play we read at school called 'Le Voyage de M. Perrichon.' It brought home the paradoxical point that we may come to dislike the person to whom we owe gratitude and really be much more at ease with the person to whom we do not. If there is not anything necessarily wrong with being a giver there is certainly something wrong with any governmental giving that expects public expressions of gratitude in return. From this point of view it may be easier for gifts to be made from private foundations (like the Ford support of community development in India), or by a metropolitan government to its own independent colonies (where it is admitted that it has an obligation), than by one independent country to another independent country. If independent governments are to be involved (as they must be) then the best kind of arrangement is surely one in which there is planning by inter-governmental agencies of which all are members and to which all pay their subscriptions, even though these are of different sizes; and in whose service people of both developed and under-developed countries work side by side, at headquarters and in the field, as human equals. On all this the Labour Party statement is inadequate. The idea that recruitment to such expert staffs must be by written examination is naive to a degree. The suggestion that international agencies should be responsible to peoples and not to governments is even more so. How does that work out for Russia? How does that work out indeed for any nation? Didn't the Secretary of the Labour Party himself have to explain to Mr. Krushchev that peoples elect representatives for such purposes and that while their term of office continues the governments are the representatives of the people in foreign affairs?

There is nothing in the Labour Party statement incompatible with the conception that aid should not be just 'given' but should be administered in a planned way and increasingly under international auspices. Indeed the statement looks forward to this quite explicitly. But all this side of the proposal needs working out. Some of the more thoughtful voters at least will realise that there is a mechanism of proper control over expenditure while it remains under national auspices, but—talking in terms simply of wise expenditure and not implying any corruption anywhere—this is not so easy to achieve when the auspices are international and 'our' money is administered by other hands.

This leads on to the question of machinery and above all of machinery for proper co-ordination. Just what is to be co-ordinated, and whom?

First, as has been said above, any economic aid must be in planned relationship with social adaptation. Technically developed living is antithetical in so many ways, some superficial but many going really deep, to traditional pre-technical habits of life. The mere play of economic forces can do great social damage. Start mine-workings somewhere in Africa. Offer wages to attract migrant workers from the bush, or even from a neighbouring country. Take the young men almost in a block from a rural community. And what is the result? A complete unbalancing of the age distribution in that community so that even ordinary work, which involves a distribution of tasks between the age groups, cannot get done—to say nothing of the moral consequences involved. Economic change is in any case coming too fast for easy natural adjustment, such as on the whole western countries were able to make. The change can with difficulty be socially regulated under the paternalistic policy of a Trust Territory. But where people have passed the stage of tutelage and must rightly be consulted as equals this is no easy matter, either for their own leaders or for those leaders in collaboration with other governments or international agencies.

## **Co-ordination of Schemes**

Secondly, the different kinds of technical aid given to a low-income country must be worked in together so that they reinforce one another from the start. In the interlocking patterns of ill health, hunger, ignorance and lack of modern machines, skills and institutions, nothing seems remediable until some other problem has been solved. Alternatively, every solution of one problem creates others. Just to flash a light on these connections without pausing to analyse them. How can productivity be increased until ill health has been lessened? It is estimated that one death from malaria implies 2,000 working days lost before death intervenes; yet eradicating malaria only makes more mouths to feed. Again, how can there be capital accumulation until there is a cash export crop providing an investable surplus? But does not serious agricultural improvement imply a change from communal land tenure where this is still predominant? But if you effect this are you not breaking up the traditional community before you have built new securities to take the place of those it did afford? To put the matter in a nutshell with an example from education, does not the very possibility of providing enough schools in Ghana turn on the world price of cocoa, and on little else?

The realisation of the importance of such connections has administrative implications, locally, nationally and internationally. It means that locally there must be a 'team' approach. It means that nationally there must be central planning and a

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have no business supporting the Central African governments on these grounds.

But what about the view that any other government could only be less liberal? In a sense, this is true. Ever since the 1920's the opposition party has always had a 'tougher' racial policy than the government; indeed this has often been pretty well the sole point of difference between government and opposition policy and this is true of the United Federal Party and the Dominion Party now. But we should not conclude from this that the United Federal Party is therefore primarily a liberal party. The long tenure of office (ever since 1934) of Huggins' (now Lord Malvern) party was largely due to a series of accidents; the outbreak of war, Malan's election victory in 1948, and the advent of Federation. But for these, it is highly probable that his party would have been replaced by the racially more extreme opposition, and the chances of this happening to the present Rhodesian governments are growing stronger all the time. As a result, the extreme caution of the party in office on racial matters is really a permanent expression of the balance of political power. In other words, when the Dominion Party is promising to undo the Federal Government's far from liberal franchise legislation, the only wonder is that this legislation goes as far as it does. The parties can never be far apart in practice; and it is consequently a quite sufficient reason for supporting the present government, that any succeeding government would be less liberal than it is. The real question is, given that it is headed by sincere and idealistic liberals, *how* liberal can *any* Central African government, *how* liberal can *any* Central African government, largely elected by Europeans, ever be?

The population which produces this party pattern can be divided very roughly into entrepreneurs large and small (represented by trade associations, chambers of commerce and industry), farmers (represented by the Farmers' Union) and wage-earners (imperfectly represented by trade unions). Between these groups there are many grounds for conflict; for example, it would pay many employers to substitute African for European workers at a fraction of the pay, while the European unions are determined to protect their members from such African competition. Such examples could be multiplied endlessly. What is impressive is the elaborate structure of compromise that has been set up between these different groups (and their many sub-groups) *within* the European population. The Industrial Conciliation Act of Southern Rhodesia is a good example. Under it, European artisans get a virtual monopoly of most of the skilled employment; in return, they gave up their right to support a political party in the way that the T.U.C. supports the Labour Party. This cost the employers money, and ultimately cost the unions political power. The basis of the bargain was, however, the need for all sections of the European community to stand together in sharing out the first fruits of the country's economic development. Again, a host of examples of this process at work could be given, from taxation policy to

guaranteed prices for European farmers. Immigration policy itself, which bolsters the influence of the European population in an obvious way, is perhaps the most general example of all. Many European immigrants bring in talents and skills unobtainable within the Federation; but many do not, such as the unskilled workers brought in to train as footplate stokers. It would be cheaper to recruit Africans for jobs, but would break the understandings between the different sections of the European community as to where their respective interests lie.

This background of mutual protection means that political differences can occur only within fairly definite limits inside the European community—limits set by generally accepted notions of what is ultimately in everybody's interest, *qua* Europeans. The limits to liberal leadership lie, in fact, somewhere in between Federal Party and Dominion Party policy, where the centre of gravity of the Europeans' consciousness of their own interests is to be found.

But, it is argued, this conception of their own interests is mistaken; their interests are not really incompatible with a liberalisation of the regime. When this is ultimately grasped, a fully liberal democratic regime will become possible.

It may be true for *some* sections of the European population that their interests would not suffer, and might actually be served, by wholesale liberalisation, although even so it is not at all sure that what is rational is what will decide people's political attitudes. But for other sections it seems not to be true at all.

1. Official liberalism says that an expanding economy will always demand the skills the European artisans possess, and a free labour market will promote expansion. But not all Europeans are skilled or capable of becoming skilled, and even if they were it is not clear how far present European wages reflect an artificial shortage of skills due to the colour bar itself. If it were abolished, *some* workers would be likely to drop down close to the Africans' living standards—a drop of perhaps 90 per cent.

2. Private enterprise is afraid of expropriation on the Nasser or Moussadeq model, or at least of much stiffer taxation. Clearly no guarantee can be given that a government responsive to African wishes, and less choosy about which side of the Iron Curtain its foreign capital comes from, would not fulfil such fears. Central African nationalism is no exception to the rule that the *laissez-faire* system of developing a country—high profit margins, cheap indigenous labour with highly paid immigrant supervision, and a large measure of political influence—is a major cause of resentment.

3. Some farmers would be hard hit if obliged to compete freely with African food producers. Official policy is to eliminate inequality by 'levelling up' African living standards to equal those of the Europeans. This is an impossible target. The country is poor in almost every way; on the most optimistic assumptions it will remain so for generations. The way it is being developed is by foreign capital and a foreign 'elite' community, imported on the terms which are necessary to attract them. At first these terms are high profit margins and high living standards; later on, they include guarantee of



the permanency of these things—including, as the primary safeguard, permanency of control itself.

That is why, as Cyril Dunn wrote in the *Observer*, 'when the Prime Minister (Welensky) speaks of keeping political control in civilised hands he means white hands, and he is thinking not in terms of one or two more general elections but of generations yet to come.' It is far from clear that this attitude is irrational, if the European population is collectively determined not to surrender their present economic interests, as defined by the web of tacit and explicit understandings in which they are enshrined. Ultimately, it may be thought, this attitude would become irrational because it would provoke violence, which is bound to be against every one's interests; many Rhodesian liberals take this view. But on this score, official thinking has so far only extended to building up European control of the instruments of force. In short, the policy of seeking to promote liberal policies in Central Africa by supporting liberal Ministers is, taken by itself, seriously unrealistic. Nor can it be supplemented by a policy of active intervention, which is quite incompatible with it. It is necessary to choose between them.

## Further Thoughts on Economic Aid

(Continued from page 7)

strenuous effort to dissolve inter-departmental and inter-ministerial rivalries. The current example of United Nations action in Jamaica, where an officer has been seconded to work in the central planning office of the Chief Minister, is worthy of note in this respect. Internationally there is a great deal to be done to get the co-ordination between the United Nations and the different Agencies that ought to be axiomatic; and to get the co-ordination between the United Nations and bilateral schemes that is no less desirable. Much better relationships need to be worked out between the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the normal programmes of the Agencies. Strengthening of the Administrative Committee for Co-ordination between the various Agencies has been called for and is very much needed.

What would seem to emerge from such considerations? First, a recognition that bungled aid, whether it be bungled economically or socially, may in some cases be worse than none at all. Second, that putting low-income countries in a position to help themselves is more important than just dropping gifts in their lap. Third, that the sense of responsibility about these matters in the more fortunate countries might receive an even more effective outlet in an expanded international field service that is genuinely a joint service with our fellow men and women of the under-developed countries. Fourth, that all these things will go wrong if the machinery for carrying them out is not developed with imagination as well as with care for detail. To summarise: thinking should start, not stop, with the present policy statement. And the public should not be allowed to think that the one per cent. levy, however necessary, is more than a part of the whole, and not necessarily the most important part.

## Correspondence

### LABOUR AND THE COLONIES

To the Editor of VENTURE.

Sir,—I should like to take up the question you posed in your November editorial concerning whether the Labour movement will react to the challenge of the N.E.C. on colonial matters.

The first sentence of the Labour Party's Statement of Policy on Colonial Affairs (1954) reads: 'The aim of Labour's policy for the colonies is to enable them to achieve democratic self-government under conditions which ensure for their people both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter.' We should certainly accept that as a principle but might we not hesitate when considering the extent and interpretation of the words 'democratic self-government'? What form of democracy do we envisage? Can we export our form of political institution to the new colonial states? All these questions have to be faced honestly and their full implications considered if Labour's colonial intentions are to have any effect at all.

To succeed, we should canvass the opinion of the colonial peoples which must be the most important factor in shaping our policy. But we should also enquire the views of the individual members within the Labour movement. It is with this that I am concerned, in discussing means of awakening interest at constituency level, where debates on colonial affairs are practically non-existent.

First, we need to appoint a commonwealth officer as one of the voluntary officers in each constituency to be responsible for:

(a) Liaison between the national commonwealth officer at Transport House and the local party. A great deal of literature is published by the department which is rarely seen by individual members. This could be distributed among them (useful for discussion too).

(b) Informing the constituency from time to time on colonial and commonwealth matters and assisting in the formulation of relevant motions.

(c) Encouraging development of coloured organisations within the area. Where a sizeable coloured population exists, efforts to be made to encourage membership of the party by acquainting colonials with Labour's record and policies for the future.

When I was resident in Liverpool two years ago, Exchange Constituency Labour Party appointed me commonwealth officer with a similar brief.

Secondly, greater use might be made of the commonwealth office at Transport House. Regional conferences could be convened with John Hatch, the senior officer, to outline what can be done to assist our comrades overseas.

Thirdly, Labour Members of Parliament should be encouraged to devote a greater portion of their speech-making and fact-finding to colonial matters.

These are some of the factors which could be employed in bringing about an informed and virile opinion on the colonies and commonwealth within the Labour movement.

Toynbee Hall, E.1.

Eric Moonman.



# CENTRAL AFRICA ELECTORAL BILL

## Abstracts from speech by Sir John Moffat

IF the Government really desired, as it professes to desire to get rid of racial representation and, as its own chosen method of getting rid of that, is to have Africans elected in the normal electoral process and then to reduce the racial representation to the number that are elected in that way, then it seems to me that the Government, far from prohibiting individuals on the lower roll taking part in the upper election of elected members, should be insisting that they take part in it, because it is only thus that it would ever be possible to get Africans elected on this roll, and only thus would it be possible to get the racial representatives on the lower roll to disappear. So the extraordinary circumstance to me is that the Government selects its own method of getting rid of racial representation and then prohibits the only means whereby that method could be made to work. . . . If this is accepted as a reasonable possibility, then the present Bill which we are examining fails on both counts, because the number of Africans on the general roll bears no resemblance whatsoever to the number of Europeans who are going to be able to take part in the purely African election on the lower roll. The number of Africans in the upper roll is far too low. The number of Europeans who take part in a low election is far too high. If we are going to be able to lay any claim whatsoever to impartiality, it is essential under the existing conditions that the proportion of the minority in the one should bear some close resemblance to the proportion of the minority in the other. I would willingly agree to this moderating influence of a European minority being extended to cover all African representation instead of half of it, if the undertaking could be given that the European proportion in that lower election does not exceed the African proportion in the normal electoral set-up.

Now, leaving questions of morality aside altogether and considering the problem purely from the point of view of the professed reasons of Government, this Bill in demonstrating an attempt by the Government to wrest control of African racial representatives from the Africans themselves is going to be most bitterly resented by them. It is going to inflame racial antagonism—and this is the serious point about it—it is going to permit the racialistic or nationalistic candidate to allege in an election with every appearance of justification that we are trying to grab control of African members, that we are trying to get stooges in this House. . . . I do not think it can be denied that Africans as a race lose in the election of elected members and in the election of their own people in the Protectorates. How the United Kingdom Government in view of this can say that the Bill represents a gain or general advance puzzles me. I could only agree if they called it a strategic advance to the rear, because as far as I can see that is a fair assessment of the position. . . . Now there are several matters

of principle that I would like to examine. . . . The first matter is this. In my view this Bill contravenes the bargain made between the three territorial governments, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the representatives of Europeans and Africans, at the Federation conference, when this Constitution was first agreed upon. I hold that that bargain can only be abrogated when the parties to it meet again and decide to substitute something better. In other words, it is my contention that the Government is trying to do some things which cannot in fact be done until the 1960 conference. . . .

I declare categorically that had the Government disclosed during those discussions (in 1953) that the compromise reached with such effort and concession would be altered by them unilaterally without conferring, they would never have got the agreement. In point of fact, they might never have got the Federation. . . .

Not only is this a breach of the compromise agreement, but to my mind also it breaks the promises made by the individuals and Governments that were represented by that Federation Conference, to the Africans of the Northern territories.

When this Federation was thrust on an unwilling African population, it was the express wish of all the Parties and the Government at that Federation Conference that the safeguards should be put to the African people on every possible occasion and that everything should be explained to them with regard to the Constitution, and this was done. . . . I am personally involved not only because I happen to be a member of the Federation Conferences, but because the duty devolved on me as on others to make these explanations to the Africans at the request of the Parties, including the hon. members opposite. Must I tell the Africans now that the assurances which I gave them in good faith, that they would elect their own representatives, are in point of fact false and that the Federal Government which did not even have a say in the way they were elected, will see that the European voters flood them out?

Finally, if we proceed with the Bill, it will be a lasting disgrace to us as Europeans because one of our duties as a minority and as a people holding absolute power is that we cannot abuse our own power for our own benefit. This is absolute and admits of no exception.

The practical application of this to politics is that we can leave the balance of power between ourselves and Africans as it is, but if we choose to alter it we can only alter it in one direction, and that is to give the African a larger share. . . .

Sir John Moffat said in conclusion that he and some of his colleagues on the African Affairs Board were contemplating an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court to declare that the action which is contemplated, not being within the legislative competence of the legislature, is void.

\*Hansard, Federal Assembly, December 16th, 1957.



# Guide to Books . . .

## Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa

By Roland Oliver (Chatto and Windus. 30s.)

I WAS delighted to receive a copy of this book for review. I had read and admired Dr. Oliver's previous book, 'The Missionary Factor in East Africa,' and looked forward to an equally pleasant educative experience reading this, his second major historical work. Moreover, I was particularly interested in its subject. Sir Harry Johnston, for although I had read several of his books some 20 years ago and had a general idea of the work he had done in Nyasaland and Uganda, I realised that the ideas I had about him were really very vague and I welcomed the prospect of learning more. I also hoped that this book would fill out for me some of the 'scramble' in Central and Southern Africa in more detail than I had so far acquired.

### Many-sided Study

I can say at once that in none of these hopes and expectations was I disappointed. Dr. Oliver's book is well produced and his style is always easy and pleasant, and one is greatly helped in reading the text by the eleven clear and well-drawn maps which he has provided. The text is further illustrated by four drawings and by 19 beautifully printed plates. My one criticism is that the chapter headings given on the contents page do not help the reader to find his way about in the book, for the significance of most of the titles of the chapters only becomes apparent during the actual reading of the text. This fault, if it is a fault, is, however, compensated for by a good index, while for the serious student Dr. Oliver provides a very useful note on the location of the manuscripts he has studied during the preparation of his book.

The picture of Johnston that emerges from this careful and well-documented study is that of an extremely interesting and many-sided personality—clever, ambitious, and often eccentric: and while the centre of interest naturally focusses on Johnston as an administrator, Dr. Oliver does full justice to Johnston as an indefatigable pioneer in the study of African languages and as ethnographer, botanist, zoologist and historian as well as artist and prolific writer. As he says in his introduction:

'The best attempt at a history of all Africa so far published is Johnston's. It is supplemented by his encyclopaedic works on Central Africa and the Congo, Uganda and Liberia. I have encountered his name almost daily upon the lips of my colleagues who are students of African languages. It has always evoked a ready response from ethnographers and botanists, zoologists and museum curators. By the extent and variety of his contributions to learning alone Johnston, it would seem, should qualify as the completest "Africanist".'

It is particularly fortunate, and constitutes a major value of this book, that Johnston's biographer, while making a solid contribution to historical study, has

been able to inter-weave in every chapter a sympathetic treatment of Johnston's varied interests.

But when this has been said, it is Johnston as a man of action who chiefly arouses Dr. Oliver's interest.

'In the course of 20 years spent mainly in Africa he left his mark upon the Congo and Nigeria, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. In the intervals between his travels he was the friend and adviser of Lord Salisbury, the intermediary between Salisbury and Rhodes, the friend of Stanley and Kirk, of Goldie and Mackinnon . . .

Johnston's active life coincided almost exactly with the international scramble for Africa, and he himself played with intensity and enthusiasm all the most characteristic parts that fell to the "man on the spot." He was in turn explorer, concession hunter, treaty-making consul and pioneer administrator. For this reason alone his unconsummated career is decidedly worth the chronicling.'

In addition, and above all, he was undoubtedly 'a character' and this manifested itself in many ways, notably in his despatches to the Foreign Office of which Dr. Oliver quotes many examples, but notably also in his domestic arrangements. At Government House, Entebbe,

'A chimpanzee and a pair of tame baboons made free use of the public rooms, as did a lordly black eagle. . . . A baby elephant was allowed into the house for tea, helping itself to jam sandwiches from the common plate but drinking from its private milk bottle. At the front door there was a large snake pit, designed, so Johnston said, to deter the more boring class of visitors.'

### The Early Administrators

The most valuable chapters of this valuable book are naturally those which deal in detail with Johnston's work in Nyasaland and Uganda, and they have thrown, for me, a great deal of light on the formative years in the history of these two countries. In particular, I have got a clearer idea of the extent to which the niggardliness of the British Treasury piled up difficulties for the administrator on the spot, difficulties which Johnston said were greater than all the worries provided by hostile tribes and Arab slave traders and ill-health put together. This book provides enough relevant detail to enable us to read between the lines of more formal history and to see the problems facing the early colonial administrators pretty much as they saw them. Anyone having read this book will, I think, be more sympathetic and understanding in his judgment of our early colonial administrators and be more able to make a realistic appraisal of their achievements, and that, perhaps, more even than its considerable contribution to historical knowledge, is the major achievement of this book.

T. R. Batten

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## British Guiana: The Land of Six Peoples

By Michael Swan (H.M.S.O., 25s.)

This is the fourth volume in the Corona Library series on British dependencies, a series (to quote the description on the cover) 'designed to fill the place between the official Blue Books on the one hand and the writings of occasional visitors on the other.' The idea of commissioning unofficial authors to write these books was a bold one; the result in this case was something that is by no means a Blue Book, but might have been better if it had kept a little further away from the traveller's tale.

As a source of information about a little-known colony it is useful, if uneven in quality and marred by occasional errors of fact. Its shortcomings are a certain patchiness (due no doubt to the fact that the author could not cover the entire country in the time at his disposal) and occasional gross lacks of balance—why, for instance, does the Marshall report on local government get only a single paragraph, and the interesting attempts to build a local government out of sugar-estate community schemes no reference at all? On political matters Mr. Swan follows the conventional lines of criticism of the People's Progressive Party in both its forms, approves the suspension of the constitution in 1953, but fails to meet the counter-arguments that can be put up; his explanation of the reasons for the suspension is no more convincing than what was said at the time, and one is still left wondering why that particular action was taken at that particular moment, instead of earlier or later. For Dr. Jagan's character and outlook were well-known before September, 1953, but his threats could not become realities for quite a long time after that.

Yet one must commend the Colonial Office for accepting a book which is so frankly critical of the interim government on the point where it most deserves criticism—its inertia in economic matters. Mr. Swan recognises that this is one of the main reasons for Dr. Jagan and has remained healthily unimpressed by the people in Georgetown who spend so much of their time explaining why so little can be done. He has accepted one of Dr. Jagan's favourite arguments, that river-bank development and drainage work behind the coast lands can make available useful amounts of land for settlement—but no one has yet proved Dr. Jagan wrong on that point.

For the rest, the book is an interesting guide—a little history, a little gossip, a little travelogue, and

some excellent illustrations, both photographs and sketches—and deserves to be read. Nor do the results of the recent elections invalidate anything it contains. All the same, the Colonial Office should consider, in planning future volumes in the series whether the public might not be better pleased with something a trifle weightier.

T. E. M. McKitterick

## The Red Rock Wilderness

By Elspeth Huxley (Chatto and Windus, 15s.)

Miss Huxley's latest novel (not one of her best efforts) concerns a world famous biologist, Dr. Clausen, who has given up fame and fortune in order to discover the ultimate mystery of life, which he believes he can find in the heart of primitive Africa where life is still relatively simple and unsophisticated. The narrator is a young Scotsman, Andrew Colquhoun, who wants to write a biography of the famous doctor. The story is virtually one of defeat: the young Scotsman fails to write his great book, the doctor loses his life to the most primitive elements of African life, and these same elements are used to pervert African nationalism to base uses by two young European-educated Africans whose main motive seems to be hatred of the white man. The book is somewhat unsatisfying both as a dramatic story and as a story about Africa and the Africans.

Alice Lawrence

## The Royal African Company

K. G. Davies (Longmans, 1957)

Detailed and documented, this book is intended for the student, but could also fascinate anyone interested in the economic history of British expansion.

The story of the Royal African Company, last and greatest of the 17th century joint stock companies, is according to the author, one of failure from the angle, since, despite the increasing demand for slaves from the expanding sugar industry in the West Indies, it failed to make profits in the form in which they could be distributed to shareholders. Some of the Company's problems, such as the shortage of capital and investment facilities; the difficulty of communications, may be considered as peculiar to the period, but others, such as the separation of capital from management, basic to the type of organisation, may yet have lessons for the economic planners of to-day.

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